Reassessing nationalism and patriotism in the context
of the Southern Cameroons question in a united Cameroon
By Innocent Mancho
MA Public Health; PgDip Nursing, PgCert Community
Development; BA (hons) History, Forensic Psych Nurse and community development
practitioner, Clinical Liaison Mental Health
Introduction
Since November 2016, Cameroon has
found itself—not unexpectedly— in the middle of a political crisis. Some
academics, political commentators, journalists, and politicians have preferred
to call this the Anglophone Crisis. In my opinion this is wrong. It started as
a strike action called for by Anglophone lawyers and teachers to force
government to address sectoral labour grievances and limited to the Anglophone
regions. Today, however, it has metamorphosed into proportions that make it
more of a Cameroonian than exclusively Anglophone Crisis.
Even if its immediate geographic
theatre is the Anglophone regions, the present situation poses an existential
crisis for Cameroon as a whole. It has revealed fundamental cracks going
through to the foundations of the nation itself. By sticking to the label
“Anglophone crisis”, public and private commentators— those who sympathise with
the regime— are seeking to downplay the magnitude of the crisis by confining
it’s geographic and, arguably, psychological space. The objective here being to
deflect and delay, if possible social and political insurgence in other
regions. This narrative feeds into the social construction of the Anglophones
as the “other” within political discourse and therefore a group of people to be
feared; to limit sympathy and encourage apathy from the majority French
speaking population of the country. Far from being an “Anglophone crisis”, the
current situation is a Cameroonian or national crisis that touches on the
legality and legitimacy of the state; national unity and integration and, above
all, the State’s authority over 20% of the national territory. The crisis has
also exposed fundamental questions about the understanding and application of
the concepts of nationalism, citizenship and belonging, identity, community
cohesion and cohabitation in the Cameroonian context. These concepts, if poorly articulated (as has
often been the case) profoundly impact social cohesion, peace, and security.
From
Rio dos Cameroes to the Cameroon republic
In various social forums,
especially among much francophone online community, there seem to be a
misconception about the constitution and composition of the present Cameroon
nation state. By design or deceit, many tend to believe that a single
Cameroonian nation pre-dated German colonisation in 1884. This belief
contravenes all historical evidence. Before the establishment of the German
colony or protectorate the territory geographically defined thereafter as Kamerun, was a mosaic of ethnic groups
governed as kingdoms or chiefdoms. These kingdoms and chiefdoms were either
completely independent of each other or confederated.
Rio dos Cameroes, as named by the Portuguese was a reference to the
estuaries and the areas surrounding the River Wouri. German Kamerun extended beyond the frontiers of
present-day Cameroon and included northern parts of Gabon and the Congo with
western parts of the Central African Republic, southwestern parts of Chad and
far eastern parts of Nigeria. One consequence of Germany’s defeat by allied
forces during World War one (WW1) saw the re-balkanization of German
protectorates particularly between France and Britain. As a result, parts of
German Kamerun were merged with neighbouring French colonies of Gabon, Central
Africa and to an extent British Nigeria. The remaining chunk of the territory
of German Kamerun was subsequently divided into two parts: the French Cameroons
and the British Cameroons. The British Cameroons was further divided into
British Southern Cameroon and British Northern Cameroons. In UN supervised
plebiscites organized on February 11, 1961 as part of the decolonization
process of British Cameroons, British Northern Cameroons opted to achieve
independence by joining Nigeria while British Southern Cameroons voted to
achieve independence by joining French Cameroon. A number of preliminary
conclusions arise from this.
The first is that present day
Cameroon is only a fraction of what existed topographically as German Kamerun.
Second, present day Cameroon did not exist before October 1, 1961. This is the
date when the decision—independence and
reunification— taken by British Southern Cameroon eight months earlier in
the plebiscite took legal effect with Britain’s final withdrawal. Third, and
odd as it may sound, British Southern Cameroon was technically and legally an
independent territory at the same moment as it was re-joining French Cameroon,
which had gained its independence from France earlier on January 1, 1960. At
its founding therefore on October 1, 1961, present day Cameroon was not one but
two distinct territories which through the popular will of the people of the
former British Southern Cameroons and the political will of the leaders of the
French Cameroons came together to form a new state, the federal republic of
Cameroon. The 1961 Federal Republic was not German Kamerun. It was not the same
territory conquered by Allied forces in 1914/15. It was not all of the mandated
territories of the League of Nations, and it was not all of the trust
territories of the United Nation entrusted to Britain and France.
Patriotism
and nationalism, citizenship and belonging in the present
While it is
possible to discuss the current crisis as a separate and distinct episode in
Cameroon’s social and political history, it is however impossible to analyse
how the application of the concept of nationalism, patriotism and citizenship
and belonging have evolved in Cameroon without referring to the very
foundations of the Cameroon nation and the concept of “Cameronnism”. The
current crisis calls to question what it means to be Cameroonian. “Cameroonism”
refers to the ideology of being Cameroonian: the acquisition and the
development of values that are peculiar and uniquely Cameroonian and the
codification of a Cameroonian identity that provides the framework for
assessing Cameroonian patriotism, nationalism and the Cameroonian way of life.
As the debate rages on the status
of the Southern Cameroons within the present nation state, legitimate questions
have emerged about the concepts of patriotism and nationalism as understood by
citizens on both sides of the political debate.
On the one hand the “legalists”, predominantly pro government and French
speaking Cameroonians have described patriotism and nationalism as undisputed
loyalty to “les institutions républicaines”, a total acceptance of government
and an unquestioning compliance with the status quo. They see reformist,
whether progressives or “transformist” as unpatriotic and “unnationalistic”.
They portray the president as incarnating the nation therefore being the nation
such that anyone who questions the status quo or shows a dislike for the
president, in their view, equally translates into a dislike for the nation. The
president wields the power of the nation. Government and republican
institutions wield the power of the president. Failure to respect these
institutions and government is therefore non-respect for the president and
therefore unpatriotic and unnationalistic. Where institutions or agents acting
on behalf of the president and therefore the state make laws and decisions that
are unjust, illegal or morally repugnant in the application of “le devoir régalien
du chef de d’état” non-compliance with these laws and regulations are seen as
unpatriotic and unnationalistic. The argument is that the rule of law must be respected,
and redress must be sought within the rule of law even when that law is unjust
or illegally applied, deliberately misinterpreted; selectively implemented and
dynamically versatile to be moulded to suit situations and circumstances
depending on affiliations and affinities. Respecting the rule of law is
therefore an obligation that holds true only as one moves progressively away
from the centre of power. Put otherwise, respect for the rule of law is a
one-sided obligation, particularly on citizens who challenge the status quo.
Further, the fluidity of actors dilutes the consistency of law especially as
applied in the peripheries.
The relationship between the
“legalitarian” interpretation of patriotism and nationalism as applied by
pro-government and majority French speaking Cameroonians is evident in the
condescending and sometimes dismissive reactions to progressives and
“transformists. From the 1950s and well into the 1970s, UPC activists were
referred to as “les Marquis” or terrorists in modern parlance. Portrayed
as enemies of the nation, Um Nyobe; Ernest Ouandie and the UPC leadership were
decapitated (literally and figuratively) or forced into exile. The war against
the enemies of the state, unpatriotic and unnationalistic UPC supporters
resulted in the genocide of the Bassas and Bamilikes in a war that has never
been acknowledged. History, however, has revealed that those who paraded the
corridors of power and presented themselves as real patriots and nationalist
were indeed “house slaves” and colonial collaborators. The role reversal has
seen the traitors of yesterday exonerated and adored as the real nationalists
and patriots.
In the 1990s when a group of
Anglophones questioned the relevance of the one party system and challenged the
hegemony of the ruling party, they were referred to as “les ennemis dans la
maison”. Far reaching elements went
further to refer to Anglophone Cameroonians as “les Biafriens” in
reference to Ojuku’s breakaway republic in Nigeria; indirectly questioning both
their rights to citizenship and their patriotism.
The educational system of a
country forms an integral part of its cultural heritage. It is the vehicle that
links its past to its present and shapes the path for its future. The
Anglophone subsystem of education and its GCE for generations has been the
pride of the peoples of the Southern Cameroons; the GCE itself became an
institution, a symbol of pride, of identity, valued and cherished by parents, students,
and teachers alike. The experiences of Anglophone students in the technical
schools based on an adaption of the francophone system with the CAP, Probatoire
and BAC tainted the perception that Anglophones had of the French system. Not only were students taught in a strange
form of English, but examination questions also sometimes loosely translate
from French made no sense. Performance rates in these exams were almost always
appalling.
At the start of this current
crisis, Hubert Mono Djana, a francophone professor described Anglophone
teachers and parents resisting the educational harmonisation plans proposed by
the ministers of higher and secondary education as unpatriotic. The Anglophone
subsystem of education forms a core of the bilingual and bicultural nature of
the Cameroon state as founded in 1961. Touting the harmonisation agenda has
been a recurrent theme by successive governments and rings the bells of a
political agenda designed to transform the bicultural nature of the country
into a replica French Cameroun state. The Teachers Association of Cameroon
(TAC) and student protests of 1993, which led to the university uprisings and
subsequent educational reforms (the creation of the GCE board and the
University of Buea) were the direct consequences of attempts by Robert Mbella
Mbappe then minister of national education to introduce the CAP, Probatoire and
BAC in the English educational system. It was perceived by many then as an
attempt to do away with the GCE and subvert the English sub system of
education. It is, unsurprising therefore that there was a global resistance to
harmonisation, whatever the merits of it were. Merits which were poorly and condescendingly
articulated; based on an ill-thought premise and a bizarre superiority complex
that the French system of education is what is best for Cameroon. There appears
to be an unrelenting perception that what is good for the goose must by necessity
be best for the gander and the gosling. Yet the intricate historical and
political evolution of the two Cameroons suggests that this by necessity is not
always the case.
There appears to be an
institutional and a systemic connivance with the vitriolic rhetoric regarding
the patriotism of Southern Cameroonians. The unrestricted granting of media
coverage by private and public TV and radio channels to some intellectuals,
journalists and opinion leaders, whose xenophobic statements have bordered on
declaring Anglophone and southern Cameroon protesters no Cameroonians seem to
suggest this. For example, Ernest Obama a journalist on Vision 4 television
channel based in Yaoundé called for the eradication and the neutralisation of
agitators by the forces of national security. His suggestions were widely
perceived as hate speech and a call for genocide. While his diction incited a
lot of protests including among Cameroon journalists who complained to the
National Communications’ Council (NCC), Obama has remained active in the
airwaves (recently becoming a spokesperson/director of communication for Samuel
Eto’o Fils and fecafoot president) and was granted the privilege of
interviewing the minister of communication and spokesperson for the government.
Ernest Obama asked the minister about the complaints made against him by
English speaking journalist to the NCC and what the minister as chair of this
regulatory outfit will do about it. On the other hand, the minister of
communication and chair of the NCC threatened to withdraw the
licence/authorisation to broadcast of the television channel if they invited
Anglophones to talk about that did not support the position of the state in the
definition of national unity.
The virulent language has also
resonated within administrative circles. The minister of justice and the
minister of state in charge of communications variously described southern
Cameroon protesters as terrorists and openly compared them to the armed Islamic
group Boko Haram. This comparison has been repeated across various media by
academics and journalists including Owona Nguini who described southern
Cameroonian activists as “les apprentis sorcier”, “des analphabètes”, “ils sont
fous ces autonomists”, “les aventuriers”, “si les illumines de l’ambazonisme
tentent la voie armée ils seront massacre”. Thus, it is not just the
nationalism and patriotism of the Anglophones that is questioned by some French
speaking academics and public figures but their intelligence and intellectual
capacity to make judgement and independent reasoning. This lends credence to
the argument, which has also been echoed by some Anglophones, that Southern
Cameroons Protesters are manipulated by
the diasporas, who hidden in the comfort of their western societies feel safe
behind their computer screens to incite others to protest and die on the
streets.
Southern
Cameroonians as less than citizens
Objectification and
dehumanisation for decades have been employed as weapons in the pursuance of
power and domination. Europeans
justified slavery and slave ownership by describing Africans as less than
humans and developing race theory to justify their perceived superiority.
Objectification as a precursor to exploitation, violence and abuse is further
visible particularly in studies relating to gender-based violence and the role
of women in pornography. In studies of patriarchy, women are often described as
objects to be owned by men and disposed of as the owners see fit. In the current context of southern Cameroons
nationalism and politics, some Francophone academics have tended to objectify
southern Cameroons rather than describe them as citizens. To acknowledge them
as citizens and as a people would have given credence and legitimacy to their
grievances.
Thus, the recurrent theme of the
southern Cameroonian being the enemy within necessitating the need for
elimination, taming and controlling; two cubes of sugar that need to be
absorbed thereby wiping out its uniqueness and identity; dogs that pose a
threat to public peace and security needing to be put down.
The de-industrialisation of the
southern Cameroons from 1961 illustrates the paternalistic and ownership
approach in which francophone led government in Yaoundé disposed of southern
Cameroons productive industries. Thus, co-operations like the marketing board,
Power Cam; banks, cooperatives, service sectors, public works department etc.
were either shipped out of the region or facilitated to collapse. The treatment
meted on protesters— particularly university students in Buea in October and November
of 2016, the number of people killed between 22 September and 1 October 2017
and the mass incarcerations—demonstrates the less than human value attributed
the citizens of the southern Cameroons by institutions and representatives of
the state. The degrading treatment of having people bath and swim in sewage
water and mud has been a continuing act of imposing the worse forms of
humiliation. Humiliation is used to assert power through the denial and the
destruction of status. Hence the arrest and incarceration of a sitting Supreme
Court justice, a university professor, an international human rights lawyer and
a popular radio talk show host. It is employed as a form of punishment, abuse
and oppression, with the hope that the dread of humiliation will serve as a
deterrent against political agitations, protests and uprising.
The very nature of humiliation is
to undermine the victims resolve and ability against the aggressor. It targets
the victim’s self-worth and self- esteem, inflicting significant emotional and
psychological damage to eliminate the possibility of a fight back. The real
cost of humiliation is the psychological and emotional damage it creates
leaving behind a trail of post-traumatic stress. The purpose of the rampant
degrading behaviour of the military and armed forces against the population is
thus to impose a regime of fear, of anxiety and of permanent psychological
damage that will prevent a resurgence of agitations and protests. Ultimately
humiliation can be counterproductive when it bounces off on a wall of
resilience and grit, especially when this has been ignored and underestimated.
Conclusion
There is no correlation between
political party affiliation and nationalism. The Scottish National Party lost a
referendum on Scottish independence yet won a majority in the UK general
elections that followed. This supports the thesis that though the Scots are
patriotic about Scotland their love for a Scottish identity does not negate
their love for a united Great Britain. Rather than perceive Southern Cameroons
nationalism as a threat and unpatriotic manoeuvre, it should be embraced and
celebrated, protected, and recognised as being an integral to the nation
building journey.
The Scottish nationalist party
won an outright majority in the general elections in 2011 yet lost out on a
Scottish independence referendum. Their love of the Scottish nation and the
preservation of the Scottish culture and identity does not diminish their love
and patriotism for a United Kingdom of Great Britain.
To argue
that Cameroon is one or that Cameroon has always been one and indivisible is a
deliberate misrepresentation of historical facts to drive a political agenda.
The desire to maintain the unity of the Cameroon nation state should not be at
the detriment of historical truth. Genuine nationalism should not be built on
falsehood, deceit, and coercion. The construction of a stable nation must
emanate from the desires and aspirations of “home nations” to forge a single,
united yet diversified national identity built on the mutual respect of
individuality. The fight for social justice, for the rule of law, for better
governance, for transparency and for accountable must not be perceived as being
at variance with nationalism. Rather corruption; greed; usurpation of political
office, political gerrymandering, cronyism; nepotism must be seen as
unpatriotic and anathema to nation building. To label those fighting for truth,
social justice, for good governance and for effective democratic processes and
representation as unpatriotic should be seen as acts of treason.
